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plans only to the extent that it affects the equilibrium futures price; and if it affects the equilibrium futures price, it affects the production of every other firm in the industry. Thus, there are industry-wide externalities to disclosure. A futures price that is informationally inefficient will misguide the production decisions of every producer in the industry, and this real effect could potentially be very significant.
To illustrate the significance of Danthine's separation result, consider a wheat farmer who has private information that the demand for wheat at the date of harvest will be booming and, consequently, the future spot price for wheat will be high. It might seem that such beliefs would induce the farmer to plant a large amount of wheat. The separation result indicates that this intuition is false. The wheat farmer's production would be guided entirely by the futures price for wheat, and the farmer's beliefs would be used only to take a position in the futures market. Similarly, a building contractor, negotiating an upfront price for a home to be built over the next six months, should be guided solely by the prevailing futures price in the lumber market rather than by his/her beliefs regarding the uncertainties in future lumber prices. Given Danthine's separation result, we study how equilibrium prices in futures markets are affected by public disclosure of firms' hedge-related transactions. We demonstrate that a producer's optimal position in the futures market consists of two components. The first component is motivated purely by hedging considerations, in the sense that it depends solely on the firm's production plans. The second component is informationally motivated and depends exclusively on the firm's beliefs regarding conditions in future commodity spot markets. We show that if the information in the futures market is inadequate to disentangle these two components, then the equilibrium futures price will misguide production decisions. We show that, absent appropriate hedge disclosures, such confounding is inevitable.
Futures prices that are informationally inefficient for this reason are biased downward relative to an economy where all information is transparent. This downward bias leads to a potentially significant reduction in aggregate industry output. To provide some sense of magnitudes, we compute the percentage loss in expected industry output for a wide range of parameter values and examine the sensitivity of this loss to each of the key parameters in our model. We find that for the range of parameters examined, the decline in expected industry output ranges from 2.5% to 22.5%. We establish that the absence of hedge disclosures causes industry output to be imprecisely tuned to fluctuations in consumer demand for the commodity, inducing overproduction when consumer demand is low and underproduction when consumer demand is high. This insensitivity to consumer demand increases the volatility of commodity spot prices.
Futures markets provide a venue for risk sharing. A derivatives trade that offsets some inherent risk faced by an individual firm is viewed by that firm as an instrument for reducing and managing its risk exposure. But, from a social perspective, this risk management is simply a reassignment of risk to others in the economy, making a futures market an instrument for risk sharing. We demonstrate that, in addition to the downward distortion in production decisions, the absence of hedge disclosures hinders the efficient allocation of risk, thereby increasing the risk premium that is embedded in the futures price. To understand how information asymmetries influence risk sharing and risk premiums, we use Wilson's [1968] theory of syndicates to calculate the risk premium from the "surrogate" preferences and beliefs of a representative individual.
Surprisingly, the consideration of futures markets is completely absent from the current public debate surrounding SFAS No. 133 and has also been ignored in the academic literature. The emphasis, in the popular press, has been exclusively on the informational needs of the capital market. The disclosure effects we study are more fundamental, in the sense that industry output and risk sharing in commodity markets must surely affect capital market prices.' Thus, any analysis of hedge disclosures that does not consider its impact on futures markets is substantially incomplete.
Most of the academic literature on hedge disclosures has focused on the incentive issues surrounding a manager's hidden talents or efforts. DeMarzo and Duffie [1995] analyze a model of hedging where profits serve as a signal of the manager's ability. They show that if hedge positions are disclosed, a risk-averse manager would forgo desirable hedge opportunities because hedging would make profits a more informative signal of his/her ability. On the other hand, if hedge positions are not disclosed, the manager would fully hedge. Jorgensen [1997] compares deferral hedge accounting to mark-to-market hedge accounting in an agency setting where the manager may or may not be informed about the future spot price. He shows that hedging alleviates the moral hazard problem if the manager is uninformed. However, if the manager is privately informed, the moral hazard problem is exacerbated, although shareholders benefit from the profits arising from the manager's futures trades. Jorgensen also shows that under deferral hedge accounting, managers always prefer the first-best hedge position, but under mark-tomarket hedge accounting, the manager's hedge position may be distorted.
Melumad, Weyns, and Ziv [1999] study the effect of alternative hedge disclosures on the hedging choices of a firm that is concerned with the price at which it is traded in the capital market at an interim date. In 1 Production effects of disclosure have also been studied in the information-sharing literature (Gal-Or [1985] and Kirby [1988] ). In this literature, firms directly exchange information to strategically influence the production of rivals. The informational efficiency of prices is not an issue in this literature, and it is unclear how this literature could be used to examine the economic consequences of hedge disclosures.
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their model, the firm is endowed with a random quantity of a risky asset whose return can be hedged in a futures market. They show that information about the firm's asset endowments, revealed at the interim date, affects the firm's incentives to hedge at the initial date. Comprehensive fair value hedge accounting reveals sufficient information at the interim date about the firm's asset endowments to sustain first-best hedging policies, while deferral hedge accounting leads to less than first-best hedging policies.
Our study differs significantly from the previous accounting literature on hedge disclosures. Although previous studies have examined the private benefits or costs to individual firms or managers under different hedge accounting methods, the effect of hedge disclosures on the functioning of markets, and thereby on the economy-wide allocation of real resources, has not previously been examined. Private benefits and costs result in private incentives for disclosure and usually do not call for disclosure regulation. The aggregate effects, social consequences, and externalities associated with disclosure must surely be of greater concern to regulators. Our analysis focuses on the externalities associated with hedge disclosures. We show that hedge disclosures affect the informational properties of futures prices which, in turn, affect the aggregate output of the industry and thereby affect both producers and consumers.
In section 2 we describe the setting that we study and derive the separation result. Section 3 characterizes equilibrium futures prices in the absence of hedge disclosures and section 4 shows how the equilibrium changes in the presence of hedge disclosures. In section 5, we compare the equilibrium futures price in the two regimes and relate this to differences in industry output. The distortions in risk sharing and the increase in risk premium due to the absence of hedge disclosures are characterized in section 6. Section 7 provides numerical calculations to illustrate the magnitude of distortions in industry output and the sensitivity of these distortions to various parameters. Finally, in section 8 we indicate some limitations to our analysis and describe possible extensions. Proofs of propositions are contained in Appendix A.
The Model
Consider an industry with N + 1 producers indexed by i = 0,1, . ., N.
Resources are committed to production at date 1, but the output from production is available for sale only at date 2. At date 1, when production decisions are made, the date 2 commodity spot price f at which output is sold is uncertain because of uncertainties in both industry supply and consumer demand. However, there is a futures market at date 1, where producers can hedge against the uncertain spot price or take any speculative position they choose. Let pf be the price in the futures market, where Pf represents the price of a contract that promises delivery of 58 C. KANODIA, A. MUKHERJI, H. SAPRA, AND R. VENUGOPALAN one unit of the commodity at date 2. Thus, ex ante, the profit of a producer, who has known production of q units and sells z units of futures contracts, is a random variable described by:
(1)
In (1) the quantity (q -z), which could be positive or negative, represents the net trade of the producer in the date 2 spot market, and c(q) is her production cost, assumed to be increasing and strictly convex. We assume that the production plans of producers 1, . .. , Nare deterministic and publicly known, with production quantities q, .. ., qN. However, producer i = 0 (hereafter called the informed producer) has private information about her production. We model this by assuming that the resources committed to production by the informed producer determines her expected output, but her actual output fluctuates randomly around the mean due to yield uncertainties. Formally, the informed producer's output is q0 + 0, where 0 is a normally distributed random variable with zero mean and variance V0, while her production cost c(qo) depends only on her expected output. The informed producer knows the value of 0, but others in the industry know only the informed producer's expected output q0 and the distribution of 0.
All producers are risk averse, with strictly concave utility functions Ui(n). Producer i, i E {1, . .. ,N} solves:
where Ei is the expectation operator over the random variable fr conditional on producer i's information. The information available to producer i will be specified later. The informed producer solves: All producers in the industry correctly believe that the distribution of f is governed by (5). Since they are all price takers, their beliefs regarding p are independent of their own production choices, implying that the equilibrium aggregate output in (5) is viewed as a constant perturbed by the random variable 0.
PRODUCTION DECISIONS: A SEPARATION RESULT
We now derive a key result (due to Danthine [1978] ) regarding the effect of the futures price on the production decisions of each producer in the industry. 
From equation (6), we get:
Inserting ( The optimal production for uninformed producers can be derived in the same fashion as for the informed producer, the only change required is to replace fio by fi?, which is equivalent to setting 0 0= O. It follows that the optimal production for the uninformed producers is characterized by c'(q-) = pf, iE {1, . . N. L. The intuition for the result in Proposition 1 is as follows. Suppose an individual producer has information indicating that demand conditions are very favorable and therefore that the spot price will be very high. It might seem that this belief would lead her to produce a large quantity of the commodity. However, this intuition is false; what is true is that she would want to enter the spot market with a large amount of the commodity on hand. Now, given the existence of a futures market, she has two sources from which she can acquire the commodity: production and purchase in the futures market. As long as c'(q) < p1, it is cheaper to produce, but beyond this point it is cheaper to buy the commodity by taking a long position in the futures market. Therefore, she produces only to the point where c'(q) = pf. Conversely, suppose the producer has unfavorable information regarding demand conditions and expects the spot price to be lower than the futures price in the market. She is better off selling at the futures price than waiting to sell at the spot price. Therefore, she produces till the point where c'(q) = pf and sells all her production and perhaps more at pf by taking a short position in the futures market.
Notice the production is determined entirely by the futures price; beliefs about the commodity spot market are irrelevant for production purposes.2 These beliefs are rationally used only to-take a position in the futures market. Of course, when producers take short or long positions in the futures market based on their information, the futures price will change. However, the important implication of Proposition 1 is that the information that any individual producer may have regarding demand conditions in the spot market affects her production only to the extent that this information is impounded and communicated by the futures price. Additionally, if her own production is affected by her information, then the production of others in the industry is also affected, because all production is guided solely by the futures price. This sets up a strong externality. If the futures price is a sufficient statistic of all the relevant information in the economy, then the production decision of all producers is better informed and the production efficiency of the industry is enhanced. Conversely, if the futures price does a poor job at aggregating and communicating information, the production efficiency of the entire industry suffers. This is why regulators concerned with hedge disclosures ought to be fundamentally concerned with how such disclosures enhance the informational efficiency of futures prices.
We now proceed to demonstrate how, in the absence of appropriate hedge disclosures, the equilibrium futures price will be informationally inefficient and thereby misguide the production decisions of firms in the industry. We then identify the crucial hedge disclosures that would mitigate this inefficiency. 2 Danthine's separation result depends only on the ability to make a perfect hedge and not on price-taking behavior. Even an oligopolistic producer faces the same trade-off between production and futures trades as a means of reaching an optimal position in the spot market. Given a marginal cost schedule for production and a upward-sloping marginal futures price schedule, the producer would trace out the lower envelope of these two cost schedules and produce till the point where the marginal cost of production equals the marginal futures price. The separation result does not hold when the presence of basis risk or the presence of production uncertainty precludes a perfect hedge. Even in these cases, the equilibrium futures price will influence the choice of production.
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Equilibrium Futures Prices in the Absence of Hedge Disclosures
In order to obtain closed-form characterization of futures market equilibria, we make additional parametric assumptions regarding preferences and technology. Hereafter, we assume that all producers have identical constant absolute risk aversion p, i.e., Ui(it) = -e-", i E t0, 1, . . . , NI. We also assume that producers' cost functions are quadratic, i.e., c(q) = q212k, k > 0. Given Proposition 1, the latter assumption implies that the optimal production quantities of all producers are qi= kPf, i E 10, 1, . . . , NJ. We now turn to the calculation of optimal futures trades, given these optimal production quantities.
We have already assumed that the informed producer privately knows 0 which represents the uncertainty in her production. We additionally assume that the informed producer obtains private information about future demand conditions. Specifically, she observes the realization of rj which is one of the parameters in the spot demand schedule. The other producers in the industry have no private information but can extract information from the observable equilibrium futures price p1. Thus, absent hedge disclosures, the informed producer conditions her beliefs on {0OrP), and uninformed producers condition their beliefs on p1. There is no public information on individual traders' positions in the futures market, i.e., {zil is not disclosed.
Since for 
which yields the first-order condition:
Equation (11) indicates that an individual producer arrives at her optimal trade zi in the futures market, as if she first hedges her total risk exposure qi and then adjusts away from this perfect hedge via a speculative trade. Thus her recorded trade of zi consists of two components: a pure hedge component and a speculative component. For example, suppose a wheat farmer's anticipated production is 100 bushels of wheat (i.e., qi= 100), and her recorded trade in the futures market, zi, is a sale of 60 bushels of wheat. The farmer arrives at this net futures position of 60 bushels by implicitly selling her entire anticipated output of 100 bushels at the futures price and then repurchasing 40 bushels. Naive observation of her recorded trade would suggest that the farmer has taken a short position of 60 bushels in the futures market and therefore must be pessimistic about the spot price of wheat. However, (11) indicates that the correct interpretation is that the farmer is long to the extent of 40 bushels of wheat and is indeed optimistic about the spot price. The farmer's information about supply and demand conditions for wheat is reflected neither in the amount she produced, nor in the amount she sold in the futures market, but in the amount she did not sell. The hedge component (100 bushels) of the farmer's net trade in the futures market is independent of her information about j, and only the speculative component (40 bushels 
Equation (13) indicates that the informed producer's optimal trade zo has both a hedge component and a speculative component similar to the trades of uninformed producers. The shock 0 in the informed agent's production quantity plays a dual role. It affects her hedge motivated trade, which is qo + 0, but it also affects her informationally motivated trade through the assessed distribution of fi. This characteristic of producers' trades is inevitable whenever they have private information about their anticipated production or risk exposure, leading to a confounding of hedge-motivated trades with informationally motivated trades. Such confounding has potent implications for the efficiency of futures prices.
Let PO represent the equilibrium futures price, determined through market clearing, in this economy with no hedge disclosures. Market 3We have assumed price-taking behavior for all firms, including the informed firm. In some situations this may be unrealistic, especially for informed firms. It is likely that an informed firm would trade strategically, taking into account the informational effect of its trades on the equilibrium futures price. The possibility of such strategic trading makes it even more desirable to mandate public disclosure of firms' inherent risk, since strategic trading would surely make the equilibrium futures price more inefficient.
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clearing requires that EN o zi = 0. Let QO -E=0 q9 be the expected equilibrium industry output, where each qi = kp?. Then, from (11) and (13), market clearing implies that the equilibrium futures price must satisfy:
Equation (14) is similar to the standard market clearing condition for any risky asset (see Grossman [1977] ). There is only one risky asset in this economy, namely, the commodity whose production is being studied. In equilibrium, all of this risky asset must be held until the spot market opens. The market price at which the risky asset is purchased is the futures price p0 and E(pi) is the expected return on the risky asset. The right-hand side of (14) then represents the aggregate demand for the risky asset, while the left-hand side represents the aggregate supply. The presence of 0 in the left-hand side of (14) represents the kind of supply noise that Grossman [1977] uses to preclude a fully revealing rational expectations price. Here, it arises naturally as a consequence of uncertainties in output leading to uncertainties in hedge-motivated trades, rather than through irrational trades by liquidity traders. As in Grossman [1977] , one would expect that this supply noise would prevent the revelation of the informed producer's knowledge of consumer demand, I, via the equilibrium futures price. This intuition is verified in the analysis to follow. Before the equilibrium futures price can be calculated, the distribution of f conditional on the information of the informed and uninformed producers needs to be specified. This requires the information content of Pf to be known. As in Grossman's [1978] "artificial economy" construction, we resolve this problem by making a conjecture about the information revealed by P)~ calculating the equilibrium trades conditional on this conjecture, and then confirming that the equilibrium p0 does, indeed, reveal the conjectured information.
Recall from (5) that the equilibrium spot price is described by:4
Now, QO is publicly known, the informed producer knows the values of ri and 0, and no agent in the economy observes the value of y. Therefore, it is reasonable to conjecture that the informed producer learns nothing from the equilibrium futures price beyond what she already knows. Given this conjecture:
4As with any normally distributed shocks to price, spot prices, futures prices, and therefore production quantities could become negative. This "absurdity" does not, however, affect the interpretation of our results. 
Inserting these beliefs for the informed producer in (14), the market clearing condition becomes:
'n -0-QOpPo E(fipO0) -p0 
5There may be other equilibriums with self-fulfilling beliefs. We have not investigated this possibility, but the equilibrium we characterize seems intuitive and plausible.
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Proposition 2 indicates that, in the absence of hedge disclosures, the futures price is informationally inefficient. The information that is relevant to production decisions is (ai -0). When this quantity is high, the spot price will also be high and producers ought to respond by increasing their production. However, production responds to variations in the statistic 5, which is not equivalent to variations in (i -0). In order to understand the source of this inefficiency, examine (18). If there were no 0 on the left-hand side of (18), then, indeed, the equilibrium futures price would reveal (i -0) and the uninformed producers would have the same information as the informed producer. The presence of 0 on the left-hand side of (18) arises from the hedging needs of the informed producer, and this component of her trade is independent of her beliefs regarding f. Only the first term on the right-hand side, which depends on (i -0), reflects her beliefs about f. Unfortunately, the hedging need of the informed producer is not publicly known; so (i -0) cannot be disentangled from 0. This is why the futures price fails to transmit all the relevant information in the economy. The precise nature of the induced production inefficiency will be elaborated in the analysis to follow.
Equilibrium in the Futures Market with Hedge Disclosures
We have shown how the futures price fails to appropriately inform production decisions when producers' hedging needs are confounded with their speculative demands. Although we have derived this result in a very simple model, where this confounding exists for only one producer, the same result will hold when many, or all, producers have private information about their hedging needs. This suggests that the crucial hedge disclosure needed is public disclosure of the inherent risk exposure of producers, which, in our model, is captured by the production quantity q0 + 0 for the informed producer.6 The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC [1997, n. 58]) refers to such risk as "primary market risk exposures" and suggests its disclosure on a voluntary basis. 6We have shown that the crucial information that needs to be publicly disclosed in order to enhance the informational efficiency of the futures price is the firm's inherent risk exposure. In our model, where firms are hedging the uncertainty in output price, this inherent risk exposure is described by the firm's output (q + 0). Clearly, there are alternative ways in which information about a firm's output could be disclosed. For example, sales forecasts or earnings forecasts could provide similar information.
However, if firms were hedging the uncertainty in the price of some important raw material, a sales forecast would not necessarily be adequate. Since inherent risk could take many different forms, such as foreign currency exposure, interest rate exposure, commodity price exposure, etc., a direct disclosure of firms' inherent risk is the most effective way to make the relevant information public. It seems that SFAS No. 133 emphasizes the mark-to-market valuation of hedge positions, and its inclusion or noninclusion in income statements, rather than the disclosure of inherent risk. Such measurement issues may be important for providing information to capital markets. However, our analysis indicates that they are irrelevant to price efficiency in a futures market. To see why inherent risk disclosures would be effective, let us examine the informed producer's first-order condition described in (13). Although not essential, let us assume that in addition to disclosure of inherent risk, q0 + 0, the informed producer's net futures trade zo is also disclosed, as required by SFAS No. 133.8 Given these disclosures, the informed producer's beliefs, E(fiITp'P)', can be immediately inferred without even inverting the equilibrium futures price. This is all the information that is needed by all the other producers in the industry. Specifically, for the model under consideration, since E(fin0,,pf) = (1 -0) -(N + 1) kpj, the information (q -0), which was hidden in the regime without hedge disclosures, can be readily inferred. Alternatively, if zo is not required to be disclosed, the value of 0 can be inferred from inherent risk disclosures; and given this direct inference, we will show that the equilibrium futures price can be inverted to infer the value of 1q. Informationally, both disclosure regimes are equivalent, but the inference problem is less demanding when inherent risk exposures as well as futures positions are disclosed.
We proceed now to the calculation of the new futures price given that only inherent risk disclosures are mandated. We conjecture that the equilibrium futures price is invertible in a, given that 0 can be directly inferred from inherent risk disclosures. If this is the case, the expectations of informed and uninformed producers coincide, so the market clearing condition becomes: Q*+ 0 = (N+ 1) ( P ) 
7 Given this choice, an informed firm may choose not to use comprehensive fair value hedge accounting, since doing so would destroy its informational advantage and likely result in lower profits. However, even though the disclosing firm may reduce its profits, there are significant social benefits associated with the disclosure, as shown by our analysis. Considering such externalities, in a futures market context, indicates that allowing such a choice is undesirable.
8 It can be shown that disclosure of producers' net futures trades, zi, with no disclosure of inherent risk, would have no effect on equilibrium futures prices. 
It is immediate from Proposition 3 that the equilibrium futures price reveals ra, given that 0 is known directly from inherent risk disclosures.
Industry Output with and without Hedge Disclosures
Having characterized the equilibrium futures price in each of the two regimes, we can now examine the implication of hedge disclosures on industry output. Since in each regime, industry output is the same multiple of the equilibrium futures price, i.e., industry output equals (N + 1) kpf + 0, we need only examine how the futures price differs in the two regimes. In order to carry out this comparison, it is useful to think of (q -0) and 0 as two distinct random variables. The market clearing condition for the futures price, characterized in (18), indicates that 0 plays a dual role. The presence of 0 on the left-hand side of (18) The factor A' contained in f3 is simply an adjustment for the fact that in an economy with endogenous production, the production quantity and, therefore, the amount of the risky asset to be traded also depends on * We repeat the above analysis for a trading economy without hedge disclosures, holding constant the aggregate endowment of the risky asset at Q + 0. The market clearing condition determining p0 is: 9 One could also examine the total sensitivity of the futures price to fluctuations in 0. This total sensitivity is described by 132 + 03 in the regime with no hedge disclosures and by f3 + P3 in the regime with hedge disclosures. It can be established that f2 + > > 0* + P* However, it is difficult to interpret this result. Algebraically it implies that, in the regime with no hedge disclosures, the effect on the futures price of shocks to hedge-motivated trades dominates the effect of production shocks on the equilibrium spot price. Proposition 4 also indicates that, absent hedge disclosures, the futures price and, therefore, industry output is relatively insensitive to fluctuations in (q -0), in comparison to the first-best economy. The reason for this is the following. A change in (q -0) is perceived only through a change in the statistic 5. Since 5 is a noisy representation of (q -0), the economy responds to fluctuations in 5 with caution, assigning a weight less than unity to 5 and putting some weight on the prior mean of (q -0). The economy cannot distinguish between fluctuations in (q -0) and fluctuations in 0 and therefore takes a middle road, underreacting to (a -0) and overreacting go 0. This relative insensitivity to (a -0) has implications for the volatility of the spot price. An increase in ri represents an upward shift in the demand function of the commodity being produced. Industry output responds inadequately to such demand increases, inducing spot prices that are unduly high. Conversely, industry output does not shrink adequately in response to a decrease in ra, making spot prices unduly low in this case. Ceretis paribus, this implies that the spot price of the commodity will be more volatile in the economy without hedge disclosures. Next, we compare the level of industry output across the two regimes. In general, the futures price will be lower in some states and higher in some other states in the regime without hedge disclosures than in the regime with hedge disclosures. We first identify the states in which the futures price and industry output are unambiguously lower. 
Since AO > A*, it follows immediately that: PROPOSITION 6. On average, industry output is strictly lower in the regime without hedge disclosures than in the regime with hedge disclosures.
In section 7, we provide numerical calculations that demonstrate that the decline in expected industry output due to lack of hedge disclosures could be very significant.
Distortions in Risk Sharing
A futures market facilitates risk sharing among risk-averse individuals when there are risks associated with production. Risk sharing generally increases the risk-bearing ability of the group of agents constituting the economy, allowing risks that would otherwise be forgone to be undertaken. In the current setting, higher risk taking is equivalent to higher in-DISCLOSURES, PRICES, AND DISTORTIONS 71 dustry output. Since the instrument that regulates industry output is the futures price, it must be the case that the combination of how risk is shared and the heterogeneity of beliefs among the informed and uninformed producers influences the level of the futures price. We have shown that absent hedge disclosures, the futures price is biased downward and, in equilibrium, the beliefs of informed and uninformed producers do not coincide. In this section, we analyze (i) the distortions in risk sharing caused by the heterogeneity of equilibrium beliefs and (ii) how the downward bias in equilibrium futures prices is caused by a higher risk premium due to the manner in which these heterogeneous beliefs are aggregated.
To examine risk sharing, we calculate the equilibrium holdings of the risky asset by informed and uninformed producers in both regimes. Since all producers are equally risk averse, it is intuitive that efficient risk sharing would imply that, in equilibrium, all producers hold an equal amount of the risky asset. We show that this is indeed the case in the first-best economy. However, in the economy without hedge disclosures, the informed producer bears a disproportionate amount of risk.
From ( 
Magnitude of Distortions in Industry Output
We have shown that, on average, industry output is lower than firstbest in the economy without hedge disclosures. In this section, we provide numerical calculations that shed some light on the magnitude of this loss and the sensitivity of this loss to various parameters. We are unable to make welfare comparisons because the consumers of the commodity under production are not explicitly modeled.10 
Extensions and Limitations
We have focused our study of hedge disclosures on effects in commodity futures markets even though most of the discussion in the popular press centers on the capital market. Given that the motive to hedge arises from the uncertainty in commodity prices, an understanding of how producers manage such uncertainty through their hedging and production activities is essential to the debate regarding the economic consequences of hedge disclosures. By studying the link between futures prices and production decisions, we have shed light on an important aspect of hedge disclosures which has been missing both in public discussions and in the academic literature. We have shown that prices in futures markets are key determinants of producers' short-term operating decisions, such as production decisions. If these prices are inefficient, producers' operating decisions fail to appropriately respond to all the information that agents possess about the underlying states of the economy. We have shown that, absent appropriate hedge disclosures, futures prices will fail to disentangle hedge-motivated trades from informationally motivated trades, making these futures prices inefficient. This type of confounding depresses expected equilibrium futures prices, which, in turn, reduces industry output. We have shown that there are strong externalities associated with hedge disclosures, in the sense that disclosures by a relatively small set of informed producers affect the operating decisions of every firm in the industry. Given such externalities, it is unlikely that incentives for voluntary disclosure will be adequate to ensure price efficiency.
Our study could be extended in several ways. In our analysis, the futures market is modeled in a static way, in the sense that futures prices do not change over time. Hence we are unable to shed light on the mark-tomarket feature of SFAS No. 133. Extending the analysis to encompass such dynamic issues would be a valuable addition to the literature. This would permit an integration of capital market and futures market effects of hedge disclosures.
We have not considered how incentives for costly information acquisition would be affected by mandatory hedge disclosures. In our model, information about consumer demand is obtained free by the informed producer. If, in fact, this information is costly to acquire, then mandatory disclosure of hedge transactions might make futures prices so informative that firms would lose the incentive to acquire such costly information.11 Such dampening of incentives for costly information acquisition, induced by hedge disclosures, could possibly make the futures price less rather than more informative. This is a valid concern that we have not addressed, and it is left for future work. Intuitively, the factors that need to be taken into account to address this concern are the amount of noise in futures prices, the cost of information gathering, the effect of some individuals' information gathering on the incentives of others to gather information, as well as effects on social efficiency and on wealth redistribution. The issue here is analogous to that of optimal patent length, and it is not clear where the line on mandatory disclosures should be drawn.
The wealth redistribution caused by hedge disclosures is a stark issue in our model, since only one producer is informed. If many producers were to privately receive noisy information about consumer demand, the equilibrium futures price would aggregate and potentially reflect the information of all informed producers. In this case, even informed producers might benefit from hedge disclosures since each would have the opportunity of learning from the information of others. In this case, it is plausible that hedge disclosures would result in a strict Pareto improvement.12
We have modeled the futures market as consisting of only those traders who are actually engaged in production. In practice, speculators who trade on private account and do not produce any of the commodity are also present in futures markets. Any disclosure mandated by the FASB or the SEC would not apply to such speculators. However, the conclusions of our study would still be valid since all of such speculators' trades are informationally motivated, so there is no confounding of hedge-motivated trades with informationally motivated trades for these speculators.
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The price-taking assumption in our model is questionable. Hellwig [1980] argues that in an economy with a finite number of privately informed agents, the assumption of price-taking behavior presents a technical quandary. In such an economy agents are "schizophrenic" in the sense that they are aware of the covariance between the noise in their private signals and the equilibrium price, yet they behave as price takers. Hellwig [1980] and Admati [1985] show how this schizophrenia problem goes away in a "large economy" where price-taking behavior is a more reasonable assumption. In such a large economy, the covariances that give rise to the schizophrenia problem converge to zero and the equilibrium price is a function of only the fundamentals and the aggregate supply noise. In our model, too, the equilibrium futures price is a function only of the fundamentals (ri -0) and the "supply noise," 0. Technically, this feature of our results is due to the assumption in our model that there is a single informed producer who perfectly learns the values of ri and 0, and acts on this information rather than extracting information from the equilibrium futures price. If instead we had assumed that there were many informed producers, each of whom had noisy information about fundamentals, we would have obtained the same results by considering a sufficiently large economy, as did Hellwig and Admati. The first two terms in the above expression are strictly positive, while the last term is equal to zero, which completes the proof. ED
